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Abstract
Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) is a set of hardware
vulnerabilities in Intel CPUs that allows an attacker to leak
bytes of data from memory loads and stores across various
security boundaries. On affected CPUs, some of these vulner-
abilities were patched via microcode updates. Additionally,
Intel announced that the newest microarchitectures, namely
Cascade Lake and Ice Lake, were not affected by MDS. While
Cascade Lake turned out to be vulnerable to the ZombieLoad
v2 MDS attack (also known as TAA), Ice Lake was not af-
fected by this attack.
In this technical report, we show a variant of MSBDS (CVE-
2018-12126), an MDS attack, also known as Fallout, that
works on Ice Lake CPUs. This variant was automatically
synthesized using Transynther, a tool to find new variants of
Meltdown-type attacks. Based on the findings of Transynther,
we analyze different microcodes regarding this issue, show-
ing that only microcode versions after January 2020 prevent
exploitation of the vulnerability. These results show that Tran-
synther is a valuable tool to find new variants, and also to test
for regressions possibly introduced with microcode updates.
1 Introduction
In May 2019, a class of CPU attacks, under the umbrella of mi-
croarchitectural data sampling (MDS), showed that Meltdown-
style attacks are still possible on Intel Core microarchitec-
ture [1, 12, 13, 15]. MDS fundamentally exploits the same
root cause as Meltdown [10] and Foreshadow [13]. MDS at-
tacks showed that Meltdown-type attacks are not limited to the
L1 cache but that they can generally leak stale data from vari-
ous internal CPU buffers [11]. In contrast to Meltdown [10]
or Foreshadow [13], the attacker has only limited control of
what data can be leaked, as these internal buffers only contain
memory loads and stores from different execution contexts,
regardless of any architectural security boundary.
Fallout [1], or microarchitectural store buffer data sampling
(MSBDS), is an MDS variant leaking recent data stores from
the store buffer. MSBDS has been shown in attacks on the
kernel space as well as on SGX [1]. In addition to the leakage
component, MSBDS can also be turned around easily to tran-
siently inject values into a victim, an attack technique known
as Load Value Injection (LVI) [14].
To mitigate these vulnerabilities, Intel released software
workarounds and microcode updates for affected CPUs [4].
One of the most recent microarchitectures, Ice Lake, is re-
ported to be unaffected by MDS attacks [6, 8]. Intel has also
explicitly listed Ice Lake processors as not being vulnera-
ble to LVI-SB [14], which exploits MSBDS for Load Value
Injection [7].
To better analyze the MDS vulnerabilities, and potentially
find new variants, Moghimi et al. [11] presented Transyn-
ther. Transynther mutates the basic primitives of existing
Meltdown-type attacks to automatically generate and evaluate
new subvariants. In the original publication [11], Transynther
did not only reproduce existing attacks but also discovered
a ZombieLoad [12] variant (Medusa) that targets the write-
combining mechanisms. In this report, we show that Tran-
synther also found a variant of MSBDS that works on the
allegedly unaffected Ice Lake microarchitecture.
Responsible Disclosure. We have reported this finding to
the Intel Product Security Incident Response Team (iPSIRT)
on March, 27, 2020. On May 5 2020, iPSIRT completed
the triage of our proof of concept, and they replied that
the mitigation for MSBDS was not ported correctly to the
Ice Lake microarchitecture. As a result, Ice Lake required
a microcode patch, which they developed as part of their
late November 2019 microcode version 0x5C. In the May
2020 update of Intel’s specification update for the 10th
Generation Intel Core Processor Family, a new errata, 057,
has been added. This errata mentions that the MDS_NO bit
in IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES control registers were incor-
rectly set [9]. Intel requested an embargo until July 14, 2020,
to allow enough time for OEMs and their customers to de-
ploy these patches. Intel credited us by updating the advi-
sory regarding Microarchitectural Data Sampling on July 14,
2020 [5]. The report was awarded a bug bounty.
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2 Fallout (MSBDS) on Ice Lake
In this section, we present the MSBDS variant automatically
synthesized by Transynther [11]. This MSBDS variant is the
only known MDS attack that works on the Ice Lake microar-
chitecture. We analyze the leakage rates of this variant, and
also the affected microcode versions.
Discovery. We ran Transynther on a Core i5-1035G1 CPU
with the latest microcode that is shipped with Ubuntu 18.04,
version 0x48. After running for about 5000 iterations, Tran-
synther reported store-to-load-forwarding leakage due to 4K
aliasing of store addresses with a faulty memory load. This
behavior was initially exploited in Fallout to bypass KASLR
and leak cryptographic keys from the kernel space [1].
Based on the generated proof-of-concept, we produced a
minimal working example to analyze the auto-generated proof
of concept that triggers MSBDS manually.
Classification. We noticed that MSBDS on Ice Lake only
works with memory load operations that suffer a permission
failure due to accessing privileged memory (cleared US bit),
or accessing a memory page with wrong protection keys [2].
Based on the systematization of Canella et al. [2], and to the
best of our knowledge, we conclude that Ice Lake is only
vulnerable to Meltdown-US or Meltdown-MPK attacks.
Modified Cache State. One of the observations from Tran-
synther is that the leakage rate increases significantly if the
target store address is flushed from the cache. We observe the
same behavior for other instructions that modify the cache
state. Specifically, executing lock incl on the store address
leads to an even higher leakage rate than flushing the store
address using clflush. Listing 1 shows our simplified proof
of concept that demonstrates MSBDS on the Ice Lake mi-
croarchitecture. Uncommenting Line 16 or 17 modifies the
cache state of the store address, resulting in a faster leakage.
If we do not modify the cache state, we observe a very slow
leakage of approximately 1 B/s. As we can see in Table 1,
with approximately 750 B/s, the leakage rate is significantly
higher when using lock inc instruction (Line 19) to modify
the cache state.
We also tested the proof-of-concept on various microcode
versions on the Ice Lake CPU. As not all issued microcodes
are officially available by CPU vendors, we used a crowd-
sourced repository of available microcodes [3]. For our analy-
sis, we applied 10 different compatible microcode versions,
i.e., microcodes that match the CPUID of our target CPU.
As we can see in Table 1, all Intel microcodes until mid-
November are vulnerable to MSBDS, although Ice Lake
should fundamentally be resistant against MDS attacks.
3 Conclusion
Our report shows that Intel Ice lake client processors with
early firmware version are vulnerable to MDS attacks. In
1 unsigned int c = 0;
2 while(cond){
3 if (! setjmp( trycatch_buf ) )
4 s_faulty_load () ;
5
6 for ( size_t i = 1; i < 256; i ++)
7 if (flush_reload (( uint8_t ∗)&oracles + i ∗PAGE_SIZE))
8 if ( i == 0x41) c++;
9 }
10
11 /∗∗ asm.S ∗∗/
12 . global s_faulty_load
13 s_faulty_load :
14 lea address_normal+0x4822, %r14 // Store address
15 lea address_supervisor +0x822, %r15 // Load address (4K alias )
16 // clflush (%r14) // Uncomment to modify cache state
17 // lock; incl (%r14) // Uncomment to modify cache state
18 movb $0x41, (%r14) // Store
19 movb (%r15), %al // Faulty Load
20 lea oracles , %r13 // Encode
21 and $0xff , %rax
22 shlq $12, %rax
23 movb (%r13,%rax,1), %al
24 ret
Listing 1: Proof of concept for MSBDS on IceLake.
Table 1: List of tested microcodes on a Core i5-1035G1 CPU.
For vulnerable microcodes, the leakage rate is much higher
if the target store is in a modified state, as it is shown by
using cache flush and modification instructions. We ran each
experiment for two minutes.
MC
Versi
on
MC
Date
Vuln
erab
le Leakage (bytes/s)
clflush lock inc Unmodified
0x32 (stock) 2019-07-05 3 577.87 754.99 1.58
0x36 2019-07-18 3 148.24 529.84 0.62
0x46 2019-09-05 3 130.15 695.80 0.11
0x48 2019-09-12 3 271.69 620.07 0.59
0x50 2019-10-27 3 96.54 542.10 0.25
0x56 2019-11-05 3 145.46 751.40 0.08
0x5a 2019-11-19 3 532.40 645.32 0.70
0x66 2020-01-09 7 0 0 0
0x70 2020-02-17 7 0 0 0
0x82 2020-04-22 7 0 0 0
0x86 2020-05-05 7 0 0 0
discussions with Intel engineers we were told that MSBDS
mitigations are present in hardware, but where disabled in
early versions of these processors. It is crucial for OEMs
and users to apply these latest microcode updates to enable
protection against MDS attacks.
More importantly, our analysis using Transynther high-
lights the importance of automated vulnerability testing and
analysis for hardware and microarchitectural vulnerabili-
ties. Although Transynther is an academic prototype, it stills
proved to be a valuable tool for automated testing of hard-
ware. The newly reported MSBDS vulnerability would not
have gone unnoticed on Ice Lake, if the earlier prototypes
of the hardware were tested using such tools. Furthermore,
OEMs could have tested these vulnerabilities before shipping
consumer laptop with a vulnerable microcode update.
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